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The statute of the state of Illinois which provides that "1contracts may be made
and liabilities incurred by a wife, and the same enforced against her to the same
extent and in the same manner as if she were unmarried," empowers a married
woman in that state to sign a note as surety for her husband.
Such a contract is not so in conflict with the general interest of the body of the
citizens of New Jersey, or its public policy, as to afford a reason for a non-enforcement of the contract in that state.
A threat made by a husband through procurement of one of the payees of a note
executed by the husband that unless his wife signed such note he would poison
himself, and which threat was made to induce, and did induce her to sign, does
not amount to duress, and is, in law, no defence to an action against her upon
such note.
Parol declarations made by the payee of a note to the maker, endorser or guarantor thereof, at the time of the signing, to the effect that such maker, endorser
or guarantor would not be called upon to pay the note, are not admissible in evidence, and are therefore no defence to an action upon such note.

THE statement of the case shows that this cause involved the
irial of two feigned issues framed to try the validity of two judgments entered upon notes, with warrant to confess judgment
against Emma M. Remington. The said notes were signed by
Emma M., and her husband, S. Remington, at Chicago, and were
payable at the same place. They were made payable to the order
of Kent & Keith, and were endorsed by them to the plaintiff after
maturity. It appeared on the trial that Emma M. signed these
notes as surety for her husband, S. Remington. To meet this the
plaintiff offered in evidence the public laws of 1861, of 1869, and
the Revised Statutes of the year 1874, of the state of Illinois.
Each contained acts relative to married women, the most important
entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to husband and

wife." Rev. (Ill.) p. 576.
When the plaintiffs rested, a motion to nonsuit was made, on the
ground that the laws of Illinois were not sufficiently proved, and
that it was not shown that there was no such law in Illinois as the
fifth section of the New Jersey Married Woman's Act. This
motion was refused.
On the part of the defendant it was shown that, at the time of
making the notes, Emma had been separated from her husband two
or three months. It was proved that the husband, to induce his
wife to sign, threatened self-destruction by taking poison unless she
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signed them. It was in evidence that Kent, one of the payees,
and his lawyer, Rockwell, solicited Mrs. Remington to sign the
notes. She swore that Kent said to her that she would not be
obliged to pay the notes. And that he said to her that "ali
he wanted was my name as security; he would let Mr. Remington
pay them afterward; Mr. Rockwell said that if he were I he would
sign the notes; I would not be obliged to pay them; Mr. Remington would pay them by work."
The charge to the jury was as follows:
"Another ground of defence is, that these notes were signed by
her in consequence of threats, made by the husband, of selfdestruction unless she executed them, and that, having been signed
under that compulsion, she insists that she is not liable. This
ground of defence resolves itself into two questions:
"First. If the threats were made by the procurement of Kent
& Keith, or their agent, Rockwell, to bring about the execution of
the notes, and if they were operative in getting her signature to
the notes, it would amount to a legal defence to this action.
"Second. If the threats were made without the knowledge of
Kent & Keith, or their agent, and were of such a character and
made under such circumstances as might reasonably be expected to
take from the defendant the power of choosing whether she would
sign the notes or not, and she did, in fact, sign them in that state
of mind, and would not have signed them at all but for such
threats, you may, for the purposes of this case, consider that she
cannot be held liable for the payment of the notes. The burden of
showing this is upon Mrs. Remington."
In charging the jury about the third ground of defence, the
court said: "There is another ground of defence, viz., that at the
time of the execution of the notes, it was represented to Mrs.
Remington, by Kent & Keith and their agent, Mr. Rockwell, that
the signing was a mere matter of form, and she would not be held
liable. If you believe that these representations were made, and
that the defendant signed the notes on the faith of them, this is a
good defence."
A verdict was returned for the defendant, Emma.
The cause was certified by the trial judge to this court for the
advisory opinion of this court upon a motion for a new trial.

H. A. Drake, for the plaintiff.
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R. S. Jenkins, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
REED, J.-The admission of the statutes of Illinois was entirely
proper under the provisions of section 22 of our Evidence Act:
Rev., p. 381. The last statute offered was relied upon by the
plaintiffs to show the validity of the contract of married women in
Illinois, the place of the making and performing the same. The
6th section of the said act-Rev. (Ill.) 1874, p. 576-is as follows:
"Contracts may be made and liabilities incurred by a wife, and the
same enforced against her to the same extent and in the same manner as if she were unmarried, but, except with the consent of her
husband, she may not enter into or carry on any partnership business, unless her husband has abandoned or deserted her, or is an
idiot, or insane, or is confined in the penitentiary."
The proviso contained in the 5th section of our Married Woman's
Act is absent from the Illinois statute, and there appears in the
latter no restriction upon the contractual ability of the married
woman to become endorser, surety or guarantor. Subject to the
exceptional instances of her engaging in partnership business, she
is as unrestricted as a ferns sole. There can, therefore, be no question but that the contract was valid by the law of Illinois.
It is, therefore, the duty of the courts of this state to recognise
and enforce it, unless it appears injurious to the interests of the
state or of our citizens. But nothing approaching this result can be
deduced solely from the fact that the foreign statute confers upon a
married woman the power to make a contract of suretyship.
That it would have been an act of legislative wisdom to have
incorporated into the Illinois act a provision similar to that in our
own and the New York state Married Woman's Act, by which the
married woman is restrained from assuming a liability as surety, I
think the testimony in this case demonstrates. But whatever may
be our opinion of the policy of legislation beyond our state, we are
bound by the principles of comity to recognise its validity, unless
it clearly contravenes the principles of public morality or attacks
the interest of the body of the citizens of our state. This does
neither, and there is no force in the objection taken upon this
ground.
The next ground of contention by the defence at the trial was
relative to the effect of the acts of the husband, and also of one of
VOL. XXVII.-94
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the payees and his attorney toward the married woman before and
at the time of signing these notes.
The court charged the jury, substantially, that if threats were
made by the husband, through the procurement of the payees or
their agent, that he (the husband) would kill himself unless she
signed, and the threats were made for the purpose of inducing,
and did induce, her to sign the notes, then the woman was not
liable upon the notes. The court also charged that even if the
threats were made without the knowledge of the payees, and were
of such a character as to deprive her of the power to choose
whether she would or would not sign, &c., then she was not liable.
Both of the above instructions were given obviously upon the
assumption that the facts upon the existence of which they were
predicated, showed such a coercion of the will of the woman as to
deprive her of the power of volition, and so the contract was
stripped of an essential element, namely, the assent of both parties
to its terms.
The common law, however, very early guarded the stability of
contracts by a rule which required the exercise of a much higher
degree of coercive force than here appears, before the question of
want of the power of consent could be entertained as a question of
fact. The degree of restraint or terror to which the party must be
subjected, as a ground for avoiding his contract, must rise to what
the law recognised as duress, and the statement of the grounds of
such avoidance appears in the earliest books of authority: Bac.
Abr., "Duress."
These grounds were stated in the case of S ooy, ads., v. State, 9
Yroom 329, and a repetition of them here would be profitless. The
language in the opinion in that case, although used in reference to
the avoidance of a bond, is applicable to the avoidance of any contract, sealed or unsealed.
In turning from the statement of what is essential to constitute
a defence upon the ground of duress, to the facts in this case, it at
once appears that they do not make a case within the rule laid
down relative to such defence. There was no imprisonment of the
woman or threat of imprisonment. There was no threatened
injury to her person.
The influence was, that her husband threatened, not to injure
her, but to kill himself. It is true that there is the statement in
the books that duress to a wife will avoid a deed made by the hus-
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band under that influence. Bac. Abr., "Duress," B. It may be
that had the payees of the note or their agent, threatened to take
the life of the husband, unless the wife signed the note, and she
signed under the influence of the'terror excited by such threats, it
would have avoided the contract. But here the threats were made
by the husband against his own life. The maker and the object of
the threats were the same. Their execution was within his own
power of volition. The wife knew that no harm could come to
him except by his own act. The present case is utterly unlike an
instance of the presence of some overshadowing danger, uncontrollable by either the wife or the person endangered.
There is no trace of a doctrine that the threat of a husband
against himself will avoid the contract of his wife, or conversely,
and such a rule would lead to an instability in that class of contracts which would be vicious.
I am unable to perceive that any duress, in the sense in which
the law has heretofore regarded it, exists in this case, either to the
husband or through him to the wife.
It is true that the privilege which the law, in many states, has
conferred upon the married woman to contract with and for the
benefit of any one, including her husband, raises novel questions.
And where the contract is for the husband's benefit in those
states where that is possible, the method by which the wife was
induced to enter into the contract, will probably afford frequent
occasions for judicial supervision. But to break down the rules of
the common law in treating of the validity of the contract of any
person whom the legislature has seen fit to invest with an unfettered contracting ability, would lead to confusion and uncertainty.
The avoidance of contracts upon the ground of undue influence,
where, although there is no duress, one of the parties has taken
advantage of the situation of the other, is a matter of purely equitable cognisance, and can receive no recognition in a court of law.'
1 Chit. on Con. 273; 1 Story's Eq. Jur., § 239.
In Miller v Miller, 68 Penn. St. 486, AGNaw, J., said: "Nor is there a
duress per minas in equity, which does not exist at law : Stouffer v. Latshaw, 2
Watts 168. The power of mind necessary to give assent to a contract, is the same
in law and equity. A chancellor, it is true, will refuse his aid to enforce specific
performance of a contract, for a reason less than that constituting duress per 7ninas,
or will set aside a bargain for extortion or undue influence operating upon a weak
mind, or under circumstances of a confidential relation ; but equity will not set aside
an agreement on the ground of duress per minas alone, where the law will refuse
to do so."
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I think there was no defence upon this part of the case.
The third ground of defence was, that at the time of the execution of the notes, it was represented to Mrs. Remington that the
signing was a mere matter of form, and that she would not be held
liable. There is no rule better settled than that evidence of contemporaneous parol declarations is inadmissible to vary the terms
of a written contract.
In the enforcement of this rule, there is often a strong tendency
to disregard its effect induced by a feeling of the inequity of holding a party to the strict performance of an agreement into which
he has entered, upon an assurance that it would not be enforced
according to its terms. This feeling has led courts sometimes to
recognise the parol declaration, upon the ground that it amounted
to an equitable estoppel. Notes to -Duchessof Kingston's ease, 3
Smith's Lead. Cas. 729. But the rule of evidence that when the
contract is reduced to writing, the writing is the only evidence of
the contract, excludes any evidence of the parol declarations.
The rule is recognised as a wholesome doctrine by which men
are enabled to place their agreements in a shape undisturbable by
the uncertainty of oral testimony. The weight of authority is
overwhelming in favor of holding, in the language of the American editors of the Duchess of Kingston's Case, that "a person
who is so ill-advised as to execute a written contract in reliance
upon an assurance that it shall not be literally enforced, must submit to the loss if he is deceived, and cannot ask that a principle of
great moment to the community shall be made to yield for the sake
of relieving him from the consequences of his indiscretion." See
cases cited in note, supra.
This rule prevails in equity as well as at law: Woollam v.
Hearn, 2 Lead. Cas. in Eq. (3d ed.) 679.
The rule is applied, in its entire rigor, to notes and bills : 2
Parsons on Notes and Bills 501; Meyer v. Beardsley, 1 Vroom
236.
The Circuit Court is advised that no legal defence to the notes
in question was offered, and that the verdict should be set aside.
It has long been settled that a man
may avoid his own act : 1st. For fear
of loss of life. 2d. Of loss of member
3d. Of mayhem, or of great bodily
harm; and 4th. Of imprisonment. See

Bac. Abr. "Duress," A. ; Co. Lit. 253
b; Foss v. Hildret , 10 Allen 76;
Foshay v. Ferguson, 5 Hill 154; Bogle
v. Hainmons, 2 Heisk. 136 ; Belote v.
Henderson, 5 Cold. 474; Baker v Mar.
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ton, 12 Wall. 158; Brown v. Pierce,
7 Wall. 214 ; Helm v. Helm, 11 Kan.
19.
At the present time, however, it is
doubtful whether the doctrine ought to
be confined within such narrow limits,
and there seems a growing tendency in
the courts of this country to extend the
old common-law rule so as to include
many cases which formerly would not
have been considered duress. As observed by Bno-soN, J., in Foshay v.
Ferguson, 5 Hill 158, as civilization
has advanced, the law has tended much
more strongly than it formerly did to
overthrow everything which is built
upon violence or fraud. See also Tapley v. Tapleg, 10 Minn. 458, per BERRY,
J. ; United States v. Huckabee, 16 Wall.
Waller v.
432, per CLIFFORD, J.;
Parker, 5 Cold. 476; Mann v. Lewis,
3 W. Va. 223; Mann v. McVey, Id.
238; Ewell's Leading Cases on Disabilities 771, etseq. ; 1 Pars. on Cont.
(5th ed.) 395.
Thus, the old authorities, and some
modern, say that menacing to commit a
battery, or a mere trespass to lands or
goods, is not sufficient to avoid the act,
because such a threat ought not to overcome a firm and prudent man, and
because the law would afford adequate redress, if actually committed : Bac. Abr.
"Duress," A. ; Bro. Abr. "Duress,"
pl. 16; 2 Inst. 483; Sumner v. Ferryman, 11 Mod. 203, cited in 2 Str. 917;
2 Greenl. Ev., 301 ; 1 Chit. on Cont.
(I1th Am. ed.) 271. But at the present time it is believed that a menace of
battery or destruction of property, provided the freedom of the will is overcome and the act procured thereby,
would avoid the act: Foshayv. Ferguson,
supra; Tapley v. Tapley, supra; United
States v. Huckabee, supra; Waller v.
Parker, supra,' 1 Pars. on Coot. (5th
ed.) 395. See also Roll. Abr. 687, pl.
3, 12 ; s. c. Book of Assizes 20, pl. 14;
9 Vin. Abr. 317, "Duress," B 3;
Lotmis v. Rack, 65 N. Y. 462.

So, the older authorities nearly all
maintain that a threat to burn one's
house or other property, does not
amounttoduress. See Bac. Abr.," Duress," A; Perkins, 18; 1 B1. Com.
130 ; Edwards v. Handley, Hardin 615 ;
Maisonnaire v. Keating, 2 Gall. 337.
See also Metc. on Cont. 25. But the
tendency and weight of modern American authority seems to support the contrary position. See Foshay v. Ferguson, supra; Bingham v. Sessions, 14
Miss. 22; Walter v. Parker, supra;
I Chit. on Cont. (11 Am. ed.) 272; 1
516 ; 1
Story on Cons. (5th ed.)
Pars. on Cont. (6th ed.) 395.
The case of duress ofgoods, so-called,
as laid down in the leading case of
Sasportas v. Jennings, 1 Bay 470; s.
c. Ewell's Lead. Cases 782, may be
mentioned as another instance of the
relaxation under certain circumstances
of the strict rule of the common law as
to what constitutes duress. Although
the doctrine of this case is opposed to
that of Skeate v. Beale, 11 Ad. & Ell.
983, s. a. Ewell's Lead. Cases 775, it
may probably be considered as supported by the weight of American
authority. See Collins v. W1'estbury, 2
Bay 211; .Bingham v. S&sions, 14
Miss. 22; Nelson v. Suddarth, 1 Hen.
& Mun. 350; Crawford v. Cato, 22
Geo. 594; Miller v. Miller, 68 Penn.
St. 493; White v. Heylman, 34 Id.
142; Spaids v. Barrett, 57 Ill. 293;
Bennett v. Ford, 47 Ind. 264 ; Modlin
v. N. W. Turnpike Co., 48 Ind. 492.
See, however, Hazelrigg v. Donaldson,
2 Met. (Ky.) 445 ; Jones v. Bridge, 2
Sweeny 431 ; Burr v. Burton, 18 Ark.
233. In Miller v. Miller, 68 Penn.
St. 486, AGNEW, J., said : "We concur with the counsel of the defendant
in error that in civil cases the rule as to
duress per minas has a broader application at the present day than it formerly
had. Where a party has the goods or
property of another in 'his power so as
to enable him to exert his control over
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it to the prejudice of the other, a threat
to use this control may be in the nature
of the common-law duress per nines,
and enable the person threatened with
this pernicious control to avoid a bond
or note obtained without consideration,
by means of such threats. See White T.
Ileyinten, 10 Casey 142, where the auBut mere
thorities are collected.
threats of injury, in regard to property,
without a power over it also, to enable
the party to execute his threats, are not
in themselves duress per minas, however otherwise they may enter into
questions of fraud or extortion."
So, in Tupley v. Tapley, 10 Minn.
448, threats by a husband to abandon
his wife, which she thought "would be
a family scandal" clearly threatening
injury to her good name, accompanied
by general abusive treatment, were
held to be duress, so as to avoid a deed
executed by her under a reasonable apprehension that they would be carried
into effect.
In 14 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 201, Mr.
W. H. Phillips has learnedly considered the question as to what amounts
to duress per minas at law ; and, after
a review of the old and modern Roman
law rules, as well as the leading English
and American cases upon the question,
he submits the following eminently
reasonable propositions :
1. "That any unlawful threats amount
to duress per minas, sufficient to avoid
a contract or agreement, if such contract or agreement would not have been
entered into, if the threats had not been
used. "
2. "1That the question whether a
contract or agreement was entered into
through fear, is a question of fact, for
the jury to decide in each individual
case, and that therefore it would be
erroneous for a judge to charge as a
principle of law, that the duress, in
order to avoid the obligation, must
have been such as was calculated to
overcome the will of a man of ordinary
firmness of mind."

Tested by the foregoing considerations, the principal case, so far as ii
touches upon the question of duress, is
not satisfactory. If the jury found that
the threats, which were operative in
procuring the wife's signature, were
made by the procurement of the payees
of the notes, it would seem clear that
their legal effect is the same as if made
by the payees themselves. See Cooley
on Torts 533, 534. And the fact that
the immediate maker and object of
the threats were the same, affords, as it
seems, no sufficient reason for holding
it not to be duress, so long as her
freedom of will was overcome thereby,
as the jury must have found. Itis well
settled that the husband may avoid an
act done by reason of duress to his
wife, and conversely that the wife may
avoid an act by reason of duress of her
husband: 2 Brownl. 276 ; Bac. Abr.,
"Duress," B. ; Plunnmerv. The People,
16 Ill. 360; Brooks v. Berryhill, 20
Ind. 97 ; Badie v. Sliummon, 26 N. Y.
9; Green v. Scranaqe, 19 Iowa 461.
By reason of the legal unity of the
husband and wife, it would seem that
the legal effect of such a threat, provided it in fact overpowered the wife's
will, must be the same as if it were
directed towards her own person, and
to hold otherwise is a mere sticking in
the bark of a legal technicality, the
real question being, was there any
assent to the contract, was the act of
the wife the offspring of her own free
will, or to the act of another acting by
the procurement of the payees? The
argument that such a rule would lead
to an instability in that class of contracts which would be vicious, has no
weight whatever, where the jury have
found as in this case, that the contract
was not the act of the wife, but of
another, unless it is deemed advisable
to give stability to contracts procured
by duress and fraud, at the expense of
the rights of married women. Duress
by a stranger, by procurement of the
party that shall have the benefit, is a
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good cause to avoid : 43 E. III. 6;
Rolle Abr. 688, s. c.
Much more
should it be good cause to avoid, when
the immediate agent is the husband,
even though the threat is aimed at his
own person and not the wife's.
It is true that it has been said that
duress by a stranger without making
the obligee party thereto, is no cause
to avoid: Keilw. 154 a; Bac. Abr.,
" Duress," B. See also Talley v. Robinson, 22 Gratt. 895. But this proposition has with good reason been questioned : 1 Story on Contracts (5th ed.),
578. See also Vander Itoven v. Nette,
32 Tex. 184; Olivari v. .Afenger, 39 Id.
76. And unless the rights of innocent
third parties have intervened which
would be prejudiced by the avoidance

of the act, it would seem the more
reasonable rule to houl that the wan
of assent renders the act voidable, even
though the party claiming the benctit
of the act may not have been privy io
the duress. The fact that a note was
originally obtained by duress, will not
be a good defence to the note in the
hands of a bona fide holder for a valuable consideration paid before its maturity : Hogan v. Aloore, 48 Geo. 136 ;
Clarke v. Peace, 41 N. H. 414. But
this principle can not affect the decision
of this case, for the reason that the
notes sued on were indorsed to plaintiffs
after maturity.
MARSHALL D. EWRLL.
Chicago, June 19, 1878.

Supreme Court Commission of Ohio.
BIRDSALL v. HEACOCK.
A letter addressed to a lumber merchant in the following language : "Pleast,
send my son the lumber he asks for, and it will be all right," is a guaranty that
the lumber sold and delivered to the son, at the time of its presentation, will be
paid for.
But such guaranty is not continuing, so as to make the guarantor liable fot
lumber subsequently purchased by the son from the same merchant. And pay.
ments afterward made by the principal, on account, will be applied in satisfaction
of the first purchase, and consequent discharge of the guarantor's liability.

ERRoR to the Court of Common Pleas of Stark county.
The original action was brought by plaintiff in error, in the
Court of Common Pleas of Stark county, against one T. C. Heacock, as principal debtor, and the defendant in error, as guarantor,
seeking to recover a balance remaining due on an account for lumber sold and delivered by plaintiff's firm to the said T. C. Heacock. The first items of the account bore date May 11th 1868,
and were of the value of $226. Then followed sundry items for
lumber delivered at different dates, extending down to January
1869, and amounting in the aggregate to $2962. Credits were
given for payments, at sundry times, to the amount of $2522.
The present defendant demurred, on the ground that the facts
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stated did not constitute a cause of action against him; and on
this demurrer judgment was rendered in his favor.
To reverse this judgment on the demurrer, the plaintiff filed his
petition in error in the District Court, where the question of error
was reserved for the decision of the Supreme Court.
That part of the petition which states the complaint against the
present defendant, was as follows:"And the plaintiff further says that, in consideration that the
firm of E. H. Potter would sell to said T. C. Heacock lumber at
his request, such as he would need in the business of a builder and
lumber merchant; which business said Heacock was about to
engage in at the time he commenced purchasing lumber of said
firm; the said Edwin Heacock did promise and guarantee in writing to said firm, that he would be accountable to said firm for
whatever lumber said firm might sell to said T. C. Heacock in his
said business, and make it all right, a copy of which guaranty is
here given as part hereof:"'Alliance, May 11th 1868.
"'E. H. POTTER: Please send my son the lumber he asks for,
and it will be all right. I had to get him to write this, as I was
kicked with a horse one week ago on the arm, and cannot more
than write my name, if that.
EDwiN HEACOCK.'
"' Signed,
"That said T. 0. Heacock is the son of Edwin Heacock, and
at the time of writing said guaranty and the commencement of
dealing between said firm and him in said account, the said T. C.
Heacock was about to engage in the business of building houses
and keeping a lumber-yard for the sale of lumber of all kinds, in
the village of Alliance, in said county of Stark, and had no capital
or credit of his own; that he expected to carry on said business
through several seasons, all of which was known to the said E. H.
Potter and to said iEdwin Heacock, and in order to give him, said
T. C. Heacock, such credit from the said firm as he might desire
in his said business, said Edwin Heacock executed said letter of
guaranty and delivered it to his son, T. C. Heacock, who is the
son mentioned therein, for the purpose of its being delivered to the
firm of E. H. Potter, as a guaranty to them, and to procure credit
for his son, and it was signed and executed by said Edwin Heacock, on or about May 11th 1868, and produced to said firm and
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delivered to it by said T. C. Heacock when he first applied to them
to buy lumber. And, induced by said letter, and in faith of said
promise and guaranty, which was then delivered to said firm in the
way of his business as such builder and keeper of a lumber-yard,
and for reasonable prices, and on reasonable terms, agreed upon
between said firm and said T. C. Heacock, said firm sold lumber to
said T. 0. Heacock, at different times, as shown in the foregoing
account, for the purpose of enabling him to carry on his said business, in all amounting to the sum of $2962.51, up to September
15th 1871, on which the sum of $2522.78 has been paid as aforesaid, and the credit and time of payment of the said lumber by
said Heacock to said firm has long since expired, and yet said T.
C. Heacock has not, nor has said Edwin Heacock, paid said sum
yet due, nor any part thereof. And of all of said premises said
Edwin Heacock had frequent notice, and yet he refuses to pay the
said firm, and to this plaintiff, as surviving partner thereof, the said
sum so due, or any part thereof, although often requested so to do."
Joseph Parker, for plaintiff in error.-The writing of Edwin
Heacock is an absolute guaranty as soon as acted upon, without
special notice of its acceptance: Powers v. Bumerantz, 12 Ohio
St. 273.
The weight of recent decisions in England and in this country
establishes the following rules for the construction of guaranties:
1. They are governed by the same rules of construction as
other contracts.
2. They are most strongly construed against the guarantor, and
there is a presumption in favor of validity.
3. The court must give effect to the intention of the parties.
4. To arrive at the intention of the parties, the circumstances
under which, and the purposes for which, the contract was made
may be proved, and must be kept in view in its construction: CrHst
v. Burlingame, 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 35; De Colyar on Guaranties
214; 2 Parsons on Contracts 500; Salmon -Palls Co. v. Portsmouth Co., 46 N. H. 249; 10 Ad. & E. 309; 5 Conn. 149; 3
Kernan 232; 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 119 ; 24 Wend. 82 ; 3 Denio 512;
5 Allen 47.
Construing this writing in the light of the rules laid down,
Edwin Heacock meant to bind himself to pay any balance owing
to the plaintiff by T. C. Heacock: Sickle v. Marsh, 44 How. 91;
VOL. XXVII.-95
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De Colyar on Guaranties 240, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248; Boehm
v. Afurphy, 40 Mo. 57.
James Amerman, for defendant in error.-The liability of Edwin
Heacock must be gathered from the entire instrument written by
him. It cannot be forced upon him by proof or allegation aliunde
the instrument. What he intended must appear in writing because
of the Statute of Frauds: Bushnell v. Bishop, 28 Ill. 204; Bussell v. Clark, 7 Cranch 62.
If the instrument is a sufficient and legal guaranty, then, as
such guaranty, it became exhausted by the first purchase under
it: Dixon v. Prusee, 1 E. D. Smith 30; Kay v. Groves, 6 Bing.
276; Haylden v. Crane, I Lans. 181; Anderson v. Bleakly, 2
W. & S. 237; Whitney v. Groot, 24 Wend. 82; Gard v. Stephens, 12 Mich. 292; 119 Mass. 435.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCOTT, J.-Counsel for defendant in error claims that the instrument of writing upon which the petition in this case bases the
liability of his client is not a guaranty of any kind. The petition,
however, avers that it was acted upon as a guaranty by the plaintiff's firm; and from its terms we think it was intended by the
writer that it should be so understood and acted on. It is not a
representation as to the solvency or pecuniary circumstances of the
party about to ask credit from the plaintiff; but a request or direction that such credit should be given, and an unqualified assurance
that the doing so would "be all right."
The sale and delivery
which it directs or requests could only be made "all right" to the
plaintiff by punctual payment, according to the terms of the sale.
And we think the writing imports a guaranty of such payment.
It was an absolute assurance that the lumber which might be delivered to defendant's son, at his request; would be paid for.
But, within a week from the date of this guaranty, the son
obtained from the plaintiff lumber to the value of $226, on the
faith of this guaranty, this being the full amount that he. then
asked for; and this amount he has since fully paid for. The only
question arising on the demurrer to plaintiff's petition is, whether
the guaranty in question is a continuing one, referable by its terms
to other and subsequent sales of lumber, made by plaintiff to defendant's son, or whether its terms limit it to a single transaction.
We see no good reason why contracts of warranty should not be
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construed by the rules applicable to the construction of contracts
generally.
As contracts by which the guarantor assumes the
position of a surety, and becomes responsible for the default of his
principal, there would seem to be good reason for not holding him
liable beyond the express terms of his agreement; and, on the
other hand, there can be no good reason why a guarantor, who
procures a credit to be given which would have otherwise been
refused, should not be held liable to the full extent warranted by
the terms of the guaranty. In all written contracts, we think the
language of the parties should be so construed as to give effect to
their clearly ascertained intention. And, as an additional rule,
we think it well settled that all contracts, in which the terms are
in any respect equivocal, should be read in the light of the circumstances under which they were entered into. This is to be done,
not for the purpose of varying the intention of the parties, as dis.
closed by the writing, but of ascertaining what the parties, in fact,
meant by the doubtful language employed for the expression of
their intention. The language of the guaranty in this case is,
"Please send my son the lumber he asks for, and it will be all
right."
There is no express limit to the quantity of lumber to be furnished. This is left to depend solely on the pleasure of the purchaser. But it may well admit of doubt whether it contemplates
more than a single purchase. Its language is in the present tense.
And it might, therefore, be held that this language embraces only
such lumber as the guarantor's son should ask for, upon the presentation of the guaranty. And as it contains no express reference
to future transactions, such, we think, should be its construction,
if read without regard to the circumstances under which it was
written or acted upon. And in support of such a construction, it
is certain that many authorities, both English and American, might
be cited. In order, therefore, to extend the meaning of this guaranty beyond the necessary import of its terms, the petition under
consideration states that it was written and acted upon under certain circumstances which are supposed to give its language a meaning that it would not otherwise import. But, looking to all the
circumstances stated in the petition, we think they are not sufficient
to give the guaranty relied on a more extended meaning than its
terms would ordinarily import. It is averred that the guarantor
knew that his son was about engaging in the lumber business,
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which he expected to carry on for several seasons. But the writing contains no reference to that fact; and it is not averred that
the son expected or intended to make a series of purchases of lumber from the plaintiff, and that this fact was known to the father.
It is also alleged that the plaintiff, from time to time, furnished to
the son the different bills of lumber stated in their account, in
reliance upon this guaranty. But it is not alleged that this fact
was, during this time, known to the father, or acquiesced in by
him. Had such been the fact, it would be a practical construction
of his contract, by the guarantor, which we might well adopt and
enforce.
Looking, then, to the language of the guaranty, its operative
words are: "Send my son the lumber he asks for, and it will be
all right." This language clearly imports that the father knew
that his son was desirous of procuring some lumber from the
plaintiff upon credit. He clearly intended to procure such credit for
his son by guaranteeing payment for such lumber as his son should
ask for and obtain upon the presentation of the writing to the
plaintiff. And we think it does not clearly import more than this.
The guaranty is co-extensive with the order or direction given,
and this order was fully complied with when the plaintiff, upon its
presentation, sold and delivered to the son the lumber which he
then asked for.
Many cases might be cited in which similar language has been
confined in its interpretation to a single transaction: Whitney v.
Groot, 24 Wend. 82; Gard v. Stevens, 12 Mich. 292; White v.
Reed, 15 Conn. 457; Anderson v. Blakely, 2 W. & S. 237.
On the other hand, cases are not wanting in which guaranties no
more comprehensive in their form of expression have, under the
circumstances of the case, been construed as continuing.
Upon this subject, it has been well said, that "the chief difficulty
lies in determining what interpretation should be put on a guaranty which is so worded that it may either extend to a series of
sales or advances, or be limited to the first. The better opinion
would seem to be, that such an instrument should be confined to
the immediate transaction, unless the language of the promise is
sufficiently broad to show that it was meant to reach beyond the
present, and render the guarantor answerable for future credits.
The tendency of decision in this country has, accordingly, been
against construing guaranties as continuing, unless the intention
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of the parties is so clearly manifested as not to admit of a reasonable doubt." 2 Am. Lead. Cas. 141; citing Congdon v. Bead, 7
R. I. 576; Gold v. Stevens, 12 Mich. 292; White v. Reed, 15
Conn. 457; Whitney v. Groot, 24 Wend. 82; Webb v. Dickerson,
11 Id. 62; Aldricke v. Higgins, 16 S. & R. 213; Anderson v.
Blakley, 2 W. & S. 237.
We are of opinion that the judgment of the Court of Common
Pleas should be affirmed. .
Judgment affirmed.
1. Even courts and text books, with
but few exceptions, fail to accurately distinguish between guaranty and suretyship. In truth, the popular meaning
of the terms is the one generally laid
down by our law writers. The dividing
line seems wholly imaginary; not that
they do not distinguish between the principal and conditional contract of warranty, but the appellation of guaranty,
or suretyship, is applied indifferently to
either kind of contract. Thus in 2 Parsons on Contracts 3, "a guaranty is held
to be a contract by which one person is
bound to another for the due fulfilment
of a promise, or engagement of a third
party." (Same definition for a surety.)
Ibid. 5. "No special words are necessary
to constitute a guaranty" (or surety).
Hilliard on Contracts, vol. 2, 28, 1,
"Suretyship is one of the forms in
which one may incur liability for the
benefit of another." Ibid. 29. "But the
established distinction between suretyship and other contracts of the same
general class, is by no means accurately
observed in the language of courts or
of elementary writers, and one may incur the liability of a surety without the
use of that particular word." All of
above remarks are applied also to
guaranty.
So Addison on Contracts 3, Il 11,
"The condition or undertaking of a
surety is a contract by one person to be
answerable for the payment of some
debt, or the performance of some act or
duty, in case of the failure of another

person who is himself principally responsible for the payment of such debt,
or the performance of the act, or duty."
(Same definitions for guaranty.)
Even Kent fails to draw the line, for
in his vol. 3, 121, "a guaranty, in its
enlarged sense, is a promise to answer
for the payment of some debt or the performance of some duty in the case of
the failure of another person who, in
the first instance, is liable."
So in the English case of Mriqht v.
Simpson, 6 Vesey 734, Lord ELDON
says, "The surety is a guaranty."
To the same tenor are most of the
different state courts. But in Pennsylvania a broad, sharp line of variance
has been laid down.
Thus, in one of the earlier cases, Afarberger et al. v. Potts, 4 Harris 9, the
court in deciding that an engagement
endorsed on a promissory note as follows: "I hereby acknowledge to be
security for the within amount of $500
until satisfactorily paid by W. A.,"
was a contract of suretyship, say, "The
word Isecurity' has an established and
well-known meaning in the minds of
most people and indicates an obligation
to stand for the sum absolutely unless
discharged by the supine negligence of
the obligor after notice. It is in broad
contrast with the word Iguaranty,2
which imparts a conditional liability if
due steps are taken against the principal."
In Allan v. Hubert, 13 Wright 259,
the question arose whether "For con-
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sideration received I hereby agree to
become security for the faithful performance of the above agreement," was
a guaranty, or a suretyship. The Supreme Court, in deciding it (STRONG,
J.), say, "We are of opinion that he
undei took as surety. His engagement
was direct, not contingent."
But in Reigart v. White, 2 P. F.
Smith 438, which is the leading case on
the subject, the court is particularly
happy and transparently clear in its
ruling. The matter before it was this,
Emory having contracted for goods
to be paid for in nails, Reigart wrote to
the seller, 11If you have not shipped the
goods, ship immediately, and I will be
responsible for the delivery of the nails
by Emory." The court (AGNEW, J.)
deciding it to be a suretyship, not a
guaranty, says, "It would be difficult
to define the commercial contract of
guaranty so clearly as to reconcile aU
the adjudged eases lying upon the confines between guaranty and suretyship.
But there is one element in the former
to be found in all guaranties which seldom fails as a mark of distinction. * *
A guaranty is an engagement to-pay in
aefault of solvency in the debtor, provided due diligence be used to obtain

C. J.), the court say, "A surety, by
his contract, undertakes to pay if the
debtor do not; the guarantor undertakes to pay if the debtor cannot. The
one is the insurer of the debt, the other
an insurer of the solvency of the
debtor."
Woods v. Sherman, 21 P. F. Smith
100, and Ashton v. Bayiard,Id. 139, are
analog@us cases.
So in Massachusetts in Dale v. Young,
24 Pick. 252, the court (SXAW, C. J.)
in holding that the words "Please send
W. goods to the amount of $100 and I
will guaranty the same in four months,"
to be a guaranty, and not a suretyship,
said, "' * ** the contract contained in
the written papers * * * was a collateral undertaking to pay in case that
Wetherbee should not, and was, therefore, strictly a guaranty for the debt of
another."
We may gather from the above cases
that a suretyship is a contract to pay if
another does not; a guaranty, a contract
to pay if another can not.
2. The view taken by the court in
the principal case as to what constitutes
a continuing guaranty seems to be the
correct one, viz., that the intention of
the parties gathered. from the four corpayment from him, ** * a contract ners of the writing, coupled with the
of suretyship being a direct liability to actions of the parties under the same,
the creditor for the act to be performed must determine the nature of the guarby the debtor, and a guaranty being a anty.
liability only for his ability to perform
Thus in Michigan State Bank v. .Toh
this act. In the former the surety as- Peck, 28 Vt. 200, the following consumes to perform the contract of the tract was held to be a continuing guarprincipal debtor if he should not, and anty: "C. C. Trowbridge, Esq., Presiin the latter the guarantor undertakes dent, Detroit, R. H. & Co., are authothat his principal can perform ; that he rized to value upon us, or either of
is able to do so. From the nature of us, to the amount of $2500, in such
the former, the undertaking is immedi- amounts and on such time as they may
ate and direct that the act shall be require, which will be duly honored, and
done, which, if not done, makes the we hereby jointly and severally hold
surety responsible at once, but from the ourselves accountable for the acceptnature of the latter non-ability (in other ance and payment of such drafts," the
court (REDFXELD,C. J.,) saying, "The
words, insolvency) must be shown."
In Kramph's Executrix v. Hat'sExec- terms used would certainly more natuutors, 2 P. F. Smith 525 (WOODWARD,
rally incline me to regard it as a single
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guaranty for $2500, and there to end.
But when we find the plaintiff acting
upon it as a continuing guarantee, and
the defendants assuming the drafts without objection, it is impossible to doubt
that it was so intended by all the parties. And as the terms used are altogether consistent with such construction, we think the practical construction
given it by all the parties must be held
binding upon them. In other words,
where the terms of a guaranty will
admit of its continuance, the practical
construction put upon it by all parties
is the true one."
In Hotchkiss v. Barnes, 34 Conn. 27,
a guaranty in these words, " Mr. H.,
you can let D. have what goods he
calls for, and I will see that the same are
settled for," was held to he a continuing contract, the court (PAnK, J.) saying, "The decisions are not uniform"
(as to guaranties) "in the conclusions
arrived at, from the fact that no two
cases can be found precisely alike, and
different courts have established different rules of construction. * * * In relation to the rule that should govern
courts in construing contracts of this
description, the weight of authority
gathered from all the cases upon this
subject, is in conformity to the rule of
construction adopted by our own court,
that the contract of a surety must be
construed according to the intent of the
parties."
In 2 Kent Com. 557, the rule is laid
down thus, "The true principle of sound
ethics is, to give the contract the sense
in which the person making the promise
believed the other party to have accepted
it, if he in fact did so understand and
accept it."
Dixon v. Frazer, 1 E. D. Smith (N.
Y.) 32, is somewhat similar to the principal case. There the father told the
plaintiff's clerk, that his son, Isaac,
would want some hardware, and requested that the plaintiff would "1let

him (the son) have what he wanted,
and he (defendant) would see that he
(plaintiff) was paid."
Hardware was
furnished to the son in consequence. A
running account was opened for four
years, until Frazer (son) failed. The
purchases were made from time to time,
though the defendant made no other
promises to pay. The court (IVooDnuFF, J.) in holding that it was not a
continuing guaranty, said, "An agreement of this description, will not be
deemed a continuing undertaking unless
its language clearly indicates that such
was the intention of the parties. The
defendant plainly had been in some
manner apprised that Isaac would want
some hardware ; when that want was
satisfied, the purpose and scope of his
promise was accomplished."
In Baker v. Rand, 13 Barb. 152 (N.
Y.) a letter as follows, "Gents, whatever goods you sell to A. B. to be sold
in our stare, we will consent that he
may take the money out of our concern
to pay for the same, &c. The said A.
shall have the liberty of taking the pay
out of our concern as fast as the goods
are sold," was held not to be a continulug guaranty, the court (HAND, J.)
saying, "A claim against a guarantor
is strictissimi juris; and the intention
should be clear and manifest. * * *
If the plain terms of the contract may
be fulfilled by being confined to one
transaction, courts are not anxious to
extend it to others. There should be
words showing the contemplation of a.
continuous supply." To the same effect.
are Lewis v. Dwight, 10 Conn. 100; Lee
v. Dick, 10 Peters 482 ; Dobbin v. Bradley, 17 Wend. 425 ; Russell v. Clark's
Ex'rs, 3 Cranch 69.
3. The rule as to notice seems to be,
that if the matter guaranteed was peculiarly within the purview and knowledge
of the plaintiff, or where he had to exercise some option, notice must be given;
but where the guarantor knew, or could
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easily have known if he would, none is
necessary ; nor is it where the guarantor
is not prejudiced by lack of it.
Thus in 3 Kent 123, 1lTherule (as to
a guaranty) is not so strict as in the
case of negotiable paper, and the neglect
to give notice must have produced some
loss, or prejudice to the guarantor."
So in Bull v. Bliss, 30 Vt. 127, the
court (BENNETT, J.) says, "The law
merchant does not extend to guaranties,
and as the case shows the utter insolvency
of the principal, there is no ground to
claim the defendant has been damnified
for want of an earlier notice. * * * It
has been frequently held that if the
notice is not in time to enable the
guarantor to save himself harmless, the
defendant must show it, and that in a
case where the defendant could not
have suffered for want of it, it is dispensed with."
In Parkman v. Brewster, 15 Gray
(Mass.) 291, the court (MERRiCK, J.)
lays down the rule thus, "If there has
been no unnecessary delay or negligence on the part of the holder of a
guaranteed note, it does not appear to
be an essential pre-requisite to the maintenance of an action against the guarantor, that a demand when the note
became due should have been made
upon, or that he should then have been
notified of the default of the maker.
The rule is somewhat different when
the guarantee is of a debt which is subsequently to be created, when the party
cannot know beforehand whether he is
to be ultimately liable, ornot, nor to
what extent, it is necessary in order to
charge him, that he should have reasonable notice of the amount of the indebtedness incurred by the principal
debtor and of his failure to pay it."
Still more clearly and emphatically is
the rule laid down in Bashford v. Shaw,
4 Ohio St. 263 (BARTLEY, J.), delivering the opinion of the court, says,
"Demand and notice are requisite to
charge a guarantor, where the fact on

which his liability is made dependent,
rests peculiarly within the knowledge
of the guarantee, or depends on his
option. But where the fact which determines the liability, is one which the
guarantor knows, or is bound to know,
or which is equally within the power of
both parties to ascertain ; in other words,
where each party has, in legal contemplation, equal means of information,
the guarantor must take notice at his
peril. * * *
So in Vyse v. Wakefield, 6 Mees. &
W. 442 (Exchequer), Lord ABINGER,
C. B., decides, "The rule is" (as to
notice in cases of guaranty) "that
where the party stipulates to do a certain thing in a certain specific event,
which may become known to him, or
with which he can make himself acquainted, he is not entitled to any
notice unless he stipulates for it; but
where it is to do a thing which lies
within the peculiar knowledge of the
other party, then notice ought to be
given. * * *" Baron PAiRE, in same
case, says, "1* * *M y present impression is that where any option at all
remains to be exercised on the part of
the plaintiff, notice of his having determined that option, ought to be given."
So also Harwood v. Ramsey, 15 S. &
R. 31 ; Fegenlnuh v. Lang, 28 Penn.
193; Brackett v. Rich, 23 Minn. 485.
4. But as to acceptance, a much
stricter rule obtains, requiring notice of
the acceptance of the guaranty as a prerequisite to liability.
Thus in Kellog9 v. Stockton, 5 Casey
(Penn.) 460, the court (LEwis, C. J.),
held, "It is essential in such a case"
(that of a guaranty) " that the plaintiff
should accept and give credit on the
faith of the proposition; and it is
equally necessary that the guarantor
should be notified that his offer has been
accepted, otherwise there is no contract.
A mere offer not accepted, is not a contract; and mere mental acceptance of a
proposition, not communicated to the
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party to be charged, is not an acceptance at all in the eye of the law. * * *
It has been said that notice of acceptance is not necessary where the agreement to accept the guaranty is contemporaneous with it : Wildes v. Savage, I
Story 26. This has been generally considered an exception to the rule,** *
but it merely affirms that when the guarantor is present, and the agreement to
accept is made the moment he offers it,
this is notice, and surely neither law
nor common sense require more."
So in Cahuzac 4- Co. v. Samini, 29
Ala. 288, the court (STONE, J.) decides,
" To render an offer" (to guaranty the

payment of a debt) " binding as a guaranty, reasonable notice must be given
that it is accepted as such, and credit
given on the faith of it." * * * "This
rule as to notice, it seems, does not
apply to cases where the guarantor and
creditor reside in the same city, and the
agreement to accept is contemporaneous
with the guaranty."
See also, White v. Reed, 15 Conn.
457; Lawson v. Town, 3 Ala. 373;
Tuckerman v. French, 7 Greenl. 115;
Kay v. Allan, 9 Barr 320; Unangst v.
Hibler, 2 Casey 153; Musseyv. Bayner,
22 Pick. 224; Beckman v. Hale, 17
G. W. REED
Johns. 134.
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An employee is entitled to have furnished to him machinery that is safe and of
this means not that it shall be such as will make accidents ima proper kind, but
0
possible, but that in view of the advantages to the business it shall be the best.
While it is the duty of a railroad company to use the best practicable appliances
in the, construction of its own cars, yet it is not negligence to receive from connecting roads for transportation over its own line, cars differently constructed.
If the cars are such as are in ordinary use upon other roads, it is the duty of the
company to receive them, and it is not liable to its own employees who may be
injured by the unfamiliar machinery.
The construction of railroad cars, the mode of working them, and the effect of
a particular thing on their safety and usefulness, are questions upon which the
opinion of experts is admissible.

APPEAL from Cass Circuit Court.

The plaintiff, claiming to be an employee of defendant, whose
duty it was to couple and uncouple cars, was injured while in the
performance of his duty without fault on his part, but through the
fault and negligence of the defendant, as he claimed. The act of
negligence stated in the petition consisted in having on its track
cars, "the couplings, bumpers or chafing irons, commonly called
dead-woods," which were not the usual ones in use upon said road,
nor such as had been in use thereon at any time during which
plaintiff had been in the employ of defendant; "but that the same
were of an old and unusual pattern, not now in use upon the cars
While engaged
of defendant, and were imperfect and defective."
in coupling such cars the plaintiff was injured.
VTL. XXVfl -96
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There was a trial, verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Wright, Gatch &' Wright, and Bising, Wright & Baldwin, for
P
appellant.
Sapp, kyman

'

Ament, for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
SEEVERS, J.-The plaintiff had only been working for defendant three or four days when he was injured. He had no previous
experience in the business. There was no evidence tending to
show the cars were out of repair; the contrary clearly appeared.
There is no dispute but the cars the plaintiff attempted to couple
had at each end double dead-woods on each side of the draft-iron,
about a foot from-it, and projecting out even with the draft-iron.
The evidence did not show the cars to be faulty in their construction in any other respect. They did not belong to the defendant,
but had been received on its track in the ordinary course of business from some connecting road. The uncontfadiAted evidence
was that cars constructed as these were, were used by Eastern
roads and were more or less frequently hauled over Western roads,
including defendant's; being usually employed in the through
freight business. The double dead-woods are not used by Western
roads generally in constructing their own cars. It was, however,
disclosed by the evidence that they are so used by the* Illinois
Central Railroad. The defendant's cars are constructed with but
a single dead-wood on each end, through which runs the draftiron. It did not appear from the evidence how long the double
dead-woods had been used or how old the pattern was.
The court instructed the jury as follows:
"The specific matters which the plaintiff charges against the
defendant in this case as negligent are, that it had upon its track
in its yard, and required him to work about cars that were
improperly constructed; in that they had couplings and buffers of
an old and unusual pattern, differing from those usually in use on
defendant's road, and different from any plaintiff had before seen
or worked with, and more dangerous than those ordinarily in use,
and that he was not informed thereof.
"1It is the duty of the defendant, so far as its own cars, or cars
controlled by it, are concerned, to place upon its track, and in use
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by its employees, only such as are well constructed for the purpose
for which they are used, and to see that they are equipped with
such appliances as experience shows are best calculated to insure
the safety of its employees.
"It is also the duty of the defendant, under the law, to receive
and draw over its railway the cars of any connecting railway when
requested, provided such cars are in good repair and properly constructed and equipped.
"But the defendant is not obliged, and ought not, to receive
upon its track and compel its employees to handle cars which by
reason of want of repair or faulty construction, or improper appliances, are shown by experience to be so dangerous to the lives of
its employees as that ordinary prudence would forbid their use.
"And if the cars which caused the injury to plaintiff were, by
reason of having the double dead-woods or buffers, so extraordinarily dangerous to handle as that ordinary prudence would forbid
their use, then it would be negligent on the part of the defendant
to either have such cars of its own on its road, or to receive from
other roads and transport them, and require its employees to
handle them."
This instruction submits to the jury to be determined: 1.
Whether cars constructed as these were are "more dangerous than
2. Have the cars in question been
those ordinarily in use."
"shown by experience to be so dangerous to the lives of its employees as that ordinary prudence would forbid their use ?" 3.
Whether the cars were, by reason of "having the double deadwoods or buffers, so extraordinarily dangerous to handle as that
ordinary prudence would forbid their use ' If these several propositions, or any of them, were found in favor of the plaintiff, then,
as a matter of law, the defendant was negligent in receiving and
having such cars on the road.
The jury were further instructed: "In determining whether
cars so equipped with double dead-woods or buffers are so unusual,
old-fashioned and dangerous as that it will be negligent 'to use
them, you ought to consider the difference between their construction and that of other patterns, the manner in which couplings
have to be made, whether defendant has such cars of its own in
use, and how generally they are in use upon well-equipped roads,
and whether or not any discrimination has ever been made by railroad companies or experienced railroad men against cars so con-
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structed, and any other matters shown in evidence bearing on this
question."
This instruction contains another thought at least on the same
subject, which is that in determining the question of negligence,
the jury might take into consideration "whether the defendant
had such cars of its own in use."
The foregoing instructions constitute the law of the case, and
therefore the conclusion is irresistible that the material question
far the jury was whether these cars were more dangerous than
those ordinarily in use, or so extraordinarily dangerous to handle
as to make it negligence to receive them.
Two witnesses on the part of the defendant gave evidence as to
the construction of the cars, and it is not claimed they were not
competent as experts.
They were asked by counsel for defendant, what advantage
double dead-woo& afforded to cars; what effect they would have,
if any, in protecting the cars from being driven together in the
course of transportation; whether with a higher degree of caution
cars so equipped could be coupled with safety. Upon the grounds
of incompetency and irrelevancy, objections to these questions
were sustained.
The questions were evidently designed to elicit from the witnesses
that the cars were not improperly constructed, and that they possessed certain advantages because of the double dead-woods. If
this had been shown it would have tended to justify their use.
Even if more dangerous to employees, the other advantages might
more than overbalance this defect. Employees are only entitled
to have used the best practical appliances, having'in view the business of the road. It will not do to say that only such appliances
shall be used as will render accidents impossible. The additional
danger from such cars, must be regarded as ordinary and incidental
to the business. If their use was justifiable under any circumstances, the degree of caution required was material, and whether
or not they could be coupled with safety.
The case at bar, we think, is distinguishable from Hamilton v.
The D. V. .Railroad Co., 86 Iowa 81, and Afuldowne, v. The
illinois, ft., Railroad Co., Id. 462. In the former, the question
was: -" What is -the proper way to couple cars when timber projects" over the end of the cars. This question had reference to
the conduct of the plaintiff, and the design was to show he had not
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used proper care, and it was said, "certainly an opinion of the witness in regard to the caution exercised by the plaintiff is not
admissible." In substance the same ruling under a different state
of facts was made in the .Aluldowney case.
It is admitted that no general rule can be laid down on this subject. The nearest approach thereto is, we think, stated in the
Muldowney case. It is there said, among other things: "Where
the question so far partakes of the nature of a science as to require
a course of previous habit or study in order to the attainment of a
knowledge of it," the opinion of witnesses competent to speak,
should be received. The construction of cars, the mode and
manner of operating them, and the effect of a particular thing on
their safety and usefulness is a habit, study or science.
We feel satisfied that the ordinary juror would not know the
effect of these double dead-woods, or whether they possessed any
advantages or disadvantages over others. We, therefore, think the
court erred in excluding the evidence sought to be introduced.
Taking the foregoing instructions together, the rule is laid down
that the defendant was bound to receive and haul these cars over
its road only in the event the jury should find that they were in
good repair and properly constructed, and the jury were authorized
to find, because of the double dead-woods, they were improperly
constructed, notwithstanding the uncontradicted testimony showed
they were in the usual course of business used on other roads.
As has been said, it was the duty of the defendant to make use
of the best practicable appliances known and in use in the construction of its own cars. Greenleafv. 171. Cent. Railroad Co.,
29 Iowa 14. But what should be the rule in a case like the
present was not determined. If the jury have the right to infer
negligence because of the double dead-woods, then it is, and must
continue to be negligence, in and of itself, for the defendant to
receive such cars or haul them over its road. This precise question, as to cars constructed like these, was determined in I., B. j.
V. Railroad Co. v. lanagan, 77 Ill. 865, and it was held that
such act did not constitute negligence.
It must be borne in mind that the question is, whether it is negligence for the defendant to receive and transport cars of other
roads in general use, and in the ordinary course of business which
are not constructed with the most approved appliances.
Public policy has some bearing on this proposition. It is
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undoubtedly of great importance to the trade and commerce of the
country that a car once loaded should go through to its destination
without breaking bulk. It is unnecessary, it is believed, to enlarge
on this point, as its importance will be readily acknowledged.
Suppose, then, the Union Pacific Railroad Company should deliver
a car constructed as these were to the defendant, which was loaded
with merchandise destined for New York, and as provided in the
code, sect. 1292, and in strict accordance therewith, request the
defendant to transport the same, would tne defendant be bound to
receive such car, and for a refusal, would it be liable in damagesthe only ground of refusal being that it was dangerous to its
employees to transport such a car, while, on the other hand, it
would be shown that cars so constructed were in use on all other
roads.
It is sufficient to say that it admits of great doubt whether such
a defence should be permitted to prevail.
The occasional or frequent use of such cars on any road in the
ordinary course of business, is one of the ordinary risks an
employee assumes. He knows, or is bound to know, that cars
from other roads are being constantly hauled over the road whose
employee he is. The most ordinary observation will teach him
this. He must know these cars may be differently constructed.
To our knowledge, at least, there is no general rule in relation
thereto, and the evidence in this case discloses the fact that none
such exists. He may well require that the cars provided by the
company whose employee he is should have all the modern appliances; but it is not reasonable that he, at the expense of the commerce of the country, should require this as to all other cars that
may be transported in the usual and ordinary course of business.
The question is not in the case whether one company is bound to
receive from another cars which are out of repair. We have,
therefore, no occasion to determine it.
It follows, from what has been said, that in giving the instrucReversed.
tions aforesaid the court erred.
The principal case discusses the liability of the master for injuries to the

where the danger is obvious, is settled
also by the case cited of I., B. 6- W.

servant occasioned by the instrumentality employet in the transaction of

Railroad Co. v. Flanagan, 77 Ills. 355,
and also by Fort Wayne, Jack. 4- Sag.

the business. That the employer is not

Railroad Co. v. Gildersleeve, 33 Mich.

liable for the injury resulting from
coupling cars of different construction,

134.
But it is apparent that injuries to the
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employee from the agency employed
may be of as great variety as the
agencies themselves. What then are
the underlying principles upon which
the liability of the master is to be determined in such cases ?
It is a well-established general principle that the master is bound to furnish
such appliances as are reasonably necessary for the safety of his employees :
Greenleaf v. l. Cent. Railroad Co., 29
Iowa 15 ; Mad River 4- Lake Erie Railroad Co. v. .Barber, 5 Ohio St. 511 ;
"Laning v. N. Y. Cent. Railroad, 49 N.
Y. 521.
When he has done this he has ordinarily discharged his duty, since the servant must necessarily take the risks
which are incident to the business, and
which cannot be foreseen. Besides,
there never can be implied an obligation on the part of the master to take
more care of the servant than he may
reasonably be expected to do of himself: Priestley v. Fowler, 3 Mees. &
Wels. 5.
The principle we are considering is
modified by the fact that in our time
most of the cases arise where the masters are corporations, which are obliged
to intrust the construction of their
machinery to others, and the management of it to the fellow servants of
those who may be injured.
In such cases the only ground of
liability of the master to the employee
for injuries resulting from the carelessness of a co-employee, is that which
arises from personal negligence, or
from want of proper care and prudence
in the management of the business, or
in the selection of the agents or appliances: Warner v. Erie Railway Co., 39
N. Y. 468.
The doctrine that one servant cannot
sue the master for injuries occasioned
tc him by a fellow servant, is extended
to the case of the construction of the
instrumentality by which the injury happentl; as where a servant miscon-

structed a scaffold, in consequence of
which a part of it broke, whereby a fellow servant fell to the ground and was
killed: Wiginore v. |Wigniare, 5 Exch.
352.

But the circumstances of construction
may be such as to impute negligence to
the master, in which case he will be liable: Ford v. Fitchburg Railroad Co.,
110 Mass. 260.
So, the master will be liable if he
gives special directions as to the employment of a machine, and a compliance with which leads to an accident :
Ind. 4- Cin. Railroad Co. v. Love, 10
Ind. 554.
In this connection also, the question
of liability may arise where the servant
whose neglect causes the injury, is superior in employment to the servant who
is injured. We understand, this prinpie, as creating liability, is only applied
where the business in which the servants
or agents are employed, is different in
its general character and purpose, and
where the two servants cannot be said
to be acting in concert with each other,
or in such a way that the duties of each
have reference to and directly tend to a
common end: Hard, Admr., v. Vt. "
Con. Railroad Co., 32 Vt. 473.
The cases frequently turn upon the
question of notice of the quality and
fitness of the instrumentality employed;
the doctrine being that before an employee can recover for an injury happening to him in the course of his ser-vice, through defects in the machinery
used in the discharge of his duties,
he must prove actual notice to the
feMillan v.
master of the defects:
Saratoga 4- Wash. Railroad Co., 20
Barb. 449 ; Keegan v. Western Railroad
Co., 4 Selden 175 ; Mad River 4- L. S.
Railroad Co. v. Barbcr, 5 Ohio St. 565 ;
Hayden v. Smithville Manuf. Co., 29
Conn. 548.
And, if the employee has the same
means of knowledge of the appliances
of the business that the master has, he

STATE v. COLLIER.
cannot recover for injuries occasioned
by those appliances being defective:
Ifayden v. Smithville Manul Co., squra;
Priestly v. kbwler, supra; Seymour v.
laddo.c, 16 A. & E. N. S. 326; Villiams
Y. Clouyh, 3 Hurls. & Norm. 258 ; Ilard
Admr. v. Vt. 4- Con. Railroad Co., supra.
And if the employee has knowledge
of the defects, and the master not, the
latter will not be liable : ,fcGlynn v.
Brodie, 31 Cal. 376.
So, where both parties know of the
defects, each takes the risk, and the
master will not be liable unless he gives
slecial directions: Ind. 4. Cin. Railroad
v. Love, 10 Ind. 557.
Where the defects are not known, and
could not be learned, as concealed
defects in the timbers of a bridge, the
master is not liable: T. P. J TV. Railway Co. v. Conroy, 61 Ills. 162.
Nor where the character and sufficiency of a railroad switch is unknown :
Lasdd v. New Bedford Railroad Co.,
119 Mass. 412.
Nor from the falling of the roof of a
mine: Hall v. Johnson, 3 Hurls. & C.
589.
Nor where a machine was used for a

dangerous and improper purpose, an&
one for which it was not provided nor
intended: Fech v. Allen, 98 Mass. 572.
Nor where the defect in a ladder was
unknown: Chicago 6. Alton Railroad Co.
v. Platt, 89 Ills. 141.
But it is the imperative duty of the
master to select fit and competent servants, and lie will be held guilty of
negligence if be fails to do so : Gilman
v. Fastern Railroad Co., 10 Allen 238;
Warner v. Erie Railway Co., 39 N. Y.
468; Frazier v. Penn. Railroad Co., 38
Penn. St. 164; Lawler v. Androscoggin
Railroad Co., 62 Me..466.
It has been held, however, that where
a servant of good character and proper
qualifications has been employed, these
traits will be presumed to continue in
him until. the master has notice of a
change, or of such facts as would put a
reasonable man upon inquiry: Chapman
v. Erie Railway Co., 55 N. Y. 585.
Where the ground of liability is the
neglect to select fit and competent servants, this must be specially alleged:
Lawler v. Androscoggin Railroad Co.,
supra.
C. H. W.

Supreme Court of MissourL.
TIlE STATE v. COLLIER.
Where a candidate for a public office publicly pledged himself to the voters
of his district that, if elected, he would perform the duties of his office for less
than half the fees allowed by law, and in consequence of such representations
and pledge, taxpayers were induced to vote for him, who would not otherwise
have voted in his favor, whereby he was elected : Hdd, that such an offer and
pledge tended to corruption, was demoralizing in its tendencies and utterly subversive of the plainest dictates of public policy, and that the title to the office
thereby obtained was invalid.

ON demurrer to quo warranto. It appeared that at a conven-

tion of the taxpayers of Callaway county, held in August 1878, to
nominate candidates for certain offices, the respondent offered a
resolution that the nominees of the convention should pledge them-

solves to perform the duties of the offices to which they might be
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elected, for much less than the compensation allowed by law; that
respondent was nominated at said convention for the office of Probate Judge, made the pledge above referred to, and at the election
following received a majority of the votes for said office. The
Attorney-General filed an information for a quo warranto, to
which respondent demurred.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHERWOOD, 0. J.-The legal sufficiency of the information being
questioned by the demurrer, requires at our hands an examination
into such alleged sufficiency.
Every one will concede that it is of the first importance that
popular elections should be conducted in such a way as to exempt
them, so far as the infirmities incident to human agencies will
permit, from improper influences. Here the demurrer confesses
that, being induced by the offers of respondent to take for his own
use only $1200 out of $2600, the aggregate fees of the desired
office of Judge of Probate, two hundred of the voters and taxpayers
of the county, who would otherwise have voted for respondent's
rival, changed their purpose and voted for respondent, who, but
for such offers and their acceptance, would never have been elected.
These admissions of the demurrer throw the burden of the assumed
lawfulness of his acts upon the shoulders of the respondent, and
the question arising upon the admitted facts is, whether the means
employed by him to secure his election were lawful means-means
such as this court can sanction, when the respondent, called upon
by our writ of quo warranto to disclose his title to the office
of Judge of Probate, discloses also that his title must, for its
validity, ultimately rest upon the means of whose employment the
state in her information complains.
In the recent case of State v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213; s. c. 14
Am. Law Reg. N. S. 90, the question raised by this information
was learnedly and exhaustively discussed, and in such a manner as
to leave nothing to be desired, and the conclusion there reached
that means similar to those employed in the present instance were
not to be tolerated, and that the title to the office secured thereby
would be declared invalid. There the contest was between two
individuals as to which was entitled to the office of county judge;
the relator claiming it in consequence of the reception of twentythree more votes than the incumbent; but the latter claimed in his
VOL. XXVII.-97
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answer that the salary of county judge was fixed at $1000, that
relator, being a candidate for the office, published and circulated
through the county a promise, addressed to the electors thereof,
that if elected county judge he would perform all the duties, and
furnish an office, and all other incidentals except the record books,
for $600 per annum during his term, and that solely by this offer,
one hundred of the voters of the county were induced to vote for
relator, thus securing his election. This was held sufficient on
demurrer.
I am unable to distinguish this case in principle from that one.
Here, it is true, the result of respondent's action, if he complied
with his promise, will not be, as there, the enriching of the county
treasury-by refraining from withdrawing therefrom a sum of
money, and thereby benefiting, pecuniarily, each taxpayer in the
county-but the legal effect of the offer of the respondent is in
nowise different; for while he does not propose to enrich the
treasury of the county, as in the Wisconsin case, he does propose
to impoverish himself, and benefit every suitor who might come
before him in his judicial capacity, by diminishing his lawful fees
to less than one-half their usual rate. In other words he appealed,
and the demurrer admits he was successful in that appeal, not to
the fair and honest judgment of the voters touching his qualifications and fitness for the office to which he aspired, but to the
cheapness with which he would discharge his judicial duties. He
said to the voters in effect and with effect, "Elect me Probate
Judge of your county, and no suitor who comes before me shall
ever be charged even half the fees which the law allows "-thus
making the office which he sought not a matter of qualification,
but of bargain and sale. It is not necessary, in this case, to show,
as claimed by respondent, that he or those who voted for him, have
been guilty of the crime of bribery in its strict sense. In instances involving the freedom and purity of elections, that term
possesses a broader significance. As is well said in the case above
cited, "It may properly be employed to define acts not punishable
as crimes, but which involve moral turpitude, or are against public
policy." And there the court held that, though the answer did
not contain allegations of fact, showing that the relator, or any of
the voters of the county, had been guilty of the criminal offence
of bribery, yet that answer was sufficient; and that acts falling
short of that crime in its more restricted and technical meaning,
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would justify the rejection of votes cast for the party made
successful by the employment of the unlawful means. And
Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown is quoted from extensively, and
fully supports the position taken, where he says:"Also bribery sometimes signifies the taking or giving of a
reward for offices of a public nature; and certainly nothing can be
neore palpably prejudicial to the good of the public than to have
places of the highest concernment, on the due execution whereof
the happiness of both king and people doth depend, disposed of,
not to.those who are most able to execute them, but those who are
most able to pay for them; nor can anything be a greater discouragement to industry and virtue, than to see those places of trust
and honor, which ought to be the reward of those who, by their
industry and diligence, have qualified themselves for them, conferred on such who have no other recommendation but that of being
the highest bidders; neither can anything be a greater temptation
to officers to abuse their power by bribery and extortion, and other
acts of injustice, than the consideration of the great expense they
were at in gaining their places, and the necessity of sometimes
straining a point to make their bargain answer their expectation :"
vol. I., ch. 27, § 3. Again, the learned author says: "It is of
the utmost importance to the public welfare that, in the administration of the government, none but persons competent to perform
the duties of their offices should be admitted into any department.
But if the sale of offices were allowed to those who have the
patronage and appointment, it is evident that there would be the
greatest danger of situations being filled, not by those whose
talents fitted them for the station, but whose purses enabled them
to obtain it. The sale of offices may, therefore, justly be ranked
as an offence against the political pconomy of the state :" vol. I.,
ch. 32, p. T48.
In Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 140, a similar view was taken,
concerning a practice which had obtained of putting up at public
auction, and disposing of the office of constable to the highest, and
of collector to the lowest bidder, the court there saying in reference
to the custom: " It has a tendeney to divert the attention of the
electors from the qualifications of the candidates, to the terms oi
which they will consent to serve, and makes the choice turn upon
considerations which ought.not to have an influence." The doctrine in that case, so far as concerns public offices, met with approval
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in Massachusetts, the court in Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick. 428, saying: "We fully recognise the validity of the objection to the sale
of offices, whether viewed in a moral, political or legal aspect. It
is inconsistent with sound policy. It tends to corruption.
It
diverts the attention of the electors from the personal merits of the
candidates to the price to be paid for the office. It leads to the
election of incompetent and unworthy officers, and on their part to
extortion and fraudulent practices to procure a remuneration for
the price paid. Nor can we discover a difference in principle
between the sale of an office for a valuable consideration and the
disposing of it to a person who will perform its duties for the lowest compensation. In our opinion, the same objection lies against
both." And the legislature of Massachusetts applied the principle
now being discussed in a still more marked manner in the year
1810. The town of Gloucester, though entitled to six representatives, for economical reasons, was accustomed to return but two
members whose pay had by law to be furnished by the town. In
that year, however, for political considerations, it was deemed
desirable that the entire number of representatives to which the
town was entitled should be elected. Whereupon several individuals, with a view to induce the town to elect a full delegation, gave
a bond for the use of the inhabitants, conditioned that the whole
expense of such a representation should not exceed the pay of two
members. But it was held by the legislature that the election was
void, though none of the members elected from the town had any
agency whatever in procuring the execution of the bond. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, after citing the above and other
authorities, say : " The doctrine which we think is established by
the foregoing authorities, and which we believe to be sound in
principle is, that a vote given far a candidate for a public office in
consideration of his promise, in case he should be elected, to donate
a sum of money or other valuable thing to a third party, whether
such party be an individual, a county or any other corporation, is
void."
We must regard the cases above cited as conclusive of this one,
and reiterate the statement that the offers in this case made by
the respondent differ in no essential particular from the Wisconsin
case; the offers in each case were equally deserving of condemnation, and were in spirit and purpose the same. For if bribery in
its larger sense, in its application to election cases, is the promise
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by the candidate to donate, if elected, a sum of money or other
valuable thing to a third party, the promise in the case at bar ought
to be held as falling within the same category, since, though the
suitors who may have to appear before the candidate when Judge
of Probate, cannot in the nature of things be designated, yet the
corrupting tendencies of the offer remain the same: remain to
swerve the voter from his duty as a citizen, to blind his perception
as to the question he should consider, the qualifications of :he candidate, and to fix them upon considerations altogether foreign to
the proper exercise of the highest right known by freemen-the
right of suffrage : a right upon whose absolutely free and untrammelled exercise depends the perpetuity of our republican institutions.
The transaction of which the state in the present instance complains may have been entered into with laudable motives, but it is,
as we think has been successfully shown, decidedly demoralizing in
its tendencies, and utterly subversive of the plainest dictates of
public policy. The maxim in such cases should be obsta principiA,
and it is only by its rigid observance by the courts that the purity
of elections can be preserved. The legislature of this state has,
as we are informei, at its last session, enacted a statutory prohibition against the employment in elections bf agencies such as
have been condemned, thus giving legislative recognition to the
principles herein enunciated.
Holding these views, the information will be held sufficient in
law, the objections taken thereto by the demurrer not well taken,
and the respondent required to plead further.
The crime of bribery is defined by
Mr. Bishop in his work on criminal
law (vol. 2 85), to be "the voluntary
giving or receiving of anything of value
in corrupt payment for an official act
done or to be done."
It has been held to be indictable to
pay or promise to pay money to a voter
to vote for a certain candidate at an
election: King v. Cripland, 11 Mod.
387 ; King v. Plympton, 2 Ld. Raym.
1377: Commonwealth v. Shaver, 3 W. &
S. 338. See also Hughes v. Marshall,
3 Tyrw. 134; 5 C. & P. 150.

See also, as to a promise to pay

money to a voter to go out of town
and forbear to vote: King v. Isherwood,
2 Keny. Notes of Cases 202. See
Bush v. Ralling, Sayer 289, which,
however, was decided on the Stat. 2
Geo. 2, c. 24, 7.
So, the sale and purchase of an office
of a public nature is considered as a
kind of bribery and indictable: Hawk.
Pleas of the Crown (8 Lond. ed), Book
1, c. 32, p. 748 ; State v. Purd, 36
Wis. 213, s. c. 14 Am. Law Reg. (N.
S.) 90;King v. Taggart, I C. & P. 201.
A distinction is, however, taken be.
tween the election of public officers, to
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-whom for the time being the exercise
of the functions of sovereignty is intrusted, and the mere choice of a site for
a public building ; and bids or pecuniary offers to secure the location of public buildings at some particular place,
are upheld as valid : Dishon v. Sinith,
10 1Dwa 212. "The former involves
the integrity of the government and the
preservation of the principles upon
which it is founded, while the latter is
only a matter of public convenience or
pecuniary interest involving no fundamental principle whatever :"1 State v.
Purdy, supra, per LYON, J.
Whether such a promise as that made
in the principal case and in the case of
State v. Purdyj, supra, would be indictable, does not appear even to have been
decided. The principal case and the
case of State v. Purdy seem to imply
that it would not be indictable. But,
as was well observed in State v. Purdy

and in the principal case, the term
bribery has a more extensive signification than that involved in the use of the
same term to designate the crime of
bribery in its strict sense, and may
properly be employed to define acts
not punishable as crimes, but which
involve moral turpitude or are against
public policy ; and upon this latter
ground of opposition to public policy
the .decisions in those two cases may
well be rested. No other cases have
been found bearing upon the point
directly involved in these two cases;
but they are so well reasoned and the
principle of their decision so entirely
satisfactory that there would seem to be
no need of fortifying them with authorities, and should similar questions arise
in the future, they would unquestionably be followed.
MARSHALL D. EWELL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
SUSAN D. H. BOYD v. SAMUEL L. CARLTON.
In an action of dower, where the husband had conveyed a tract of land, which
his grantor subsequently divided and conveyed to several persons, in severalty,
the plaintiff is entitled to have her dower set out to her in the parcel described in
her writ, according to the present value thereof, excluding the increase in value
by reason of improvements made on the same by the defendant or his grantors
since the husband aliened the tract of which said parcel is a part ; but not excluding the increased value by reason of improvements made by the owners of the
other parcels carved out of the same tract, or by their grantors.
She is entitled to have her dower assigned in the parcel held in severalty by the
defendant, precisely as though that parcel had been aliened by the husband as a
distinct estate, and by a separate conveyance.

WRIT of dower.

The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.

NW. Webb & T.

. ifaskell, for the plaintiff.

J. & -E. H. Band, for the defendant.
The general principle we assume to be well settled that the
dower must be adjudged according to the value of the land at the
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time of the assignment, excluding all increased value from improvements made upon the premises by the alienee, leaving the dowress
the benefit of any increase of value arising from circumstances
unconnected with these improvements: 1 Wash. R. Prop. (3d ed.)
273, and cases there cited. Or, as this court say in Carter v.
Parker, 28 Me. 509, such part of the land is to be set out as
will produce an income equal to one-third of the income which the
estate would have produced if no improvements had been made
since alienation.
Of land taken on execution from husband, the wife is dowable,
as it existed at time of levy, and not in improvements made after:
Ayer v. Spring, 9 Mass. 8.
The facts in this case are somewhat peculiar, but do not vary in
principle. This land (four acres) was aliened in one piece, and
was so held by the alienee for many years. Had it, to the death of
the husband, remained in one piece, owned by one person, or by
many as tenants in common, and been literally covered with valuable improvements, the law is settled that the dower must be set
out, excluding all increased value from improvements. But after
the alienation by plaintiff's husband, the tract (the four acres) was
divided into some twenty lots, which, during the life of the husband, became the property in severalty of some twenty different
owners, and these different owners have each and all made valuable
improvements upon their several lots; and now this plaintiff, suing
each and all of these several owners, claims against each of them
and against his lot, to have the benefit, in the assignment of her
dower, of the increased value thereof from all the improvements
made upon their several lots by all of the others. Does this subdivision of the lot, originally alienated by the husband, change the
principle of law regulating her dower, and give her, in this indirect way, the benefit of the improvements made upon the alienated
premises? The subdivision of the lot changes the mode of proceeding to obtain dower, and of setting it out, but not the principle of law governing the assignment. The words, "improvements made upon the premises," as used in the decisions, do not
mean improvements made upon the premises demanded in the writ,
but improvements made upon the aliened premises.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BA]RROWS, J.-The lot in which the plaintiff here demands her
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dower is part of a parcel of about four acres of land in Portland,
which was owned by the plaintiff's husband during the coverture,
until it passed from him in 1841 by the levy of an execution on
the entire parcel in favor of the president, directors and company
of the Exchange Bank. At the time of the levy there were no
buildings on said fbur-acre parcel ; but, a few years later, a street
was opened through it, and the remainder was divided into lots of
convenient size, one of which is the defendant's, and all of which
have passed into the hands of sundry persons holding under sundry mesne conveyances from said bank; and valuable houses have
been built upon all of them. The defendant's lot has been improved
by filling, draining and fencing, and the erection of a valuable
house thereon.
The defendant, not denying the plaintiff's right to dowei in
this lot, contends that she is entitled to have set out to her only
such part thereof as will produce an income equal to one-third of
the income which said lot would now produce if no improvements
had been made since the levy upon any portion of the tract levied
upon.
The plaintiff claims that she is entitled to her dower in the
premises described in her writ according to the present value
thereof, excluding the increased value by reason of improvements
on the same by the successive tenants since the time when her husband aliened the premises, but that she, and not the tenant, is
entitled to the benefit of any increased value of the lot by reason
of improvements made since the levy on other parcels of the entire
four-acre tract.
Both parties accept as correct the general principle as stated in
many American cases where dower is awarded against the alienees
of the husband or their grantees, and in the text books, substantially thus: The dower is to be assigned according to the value
of the lands at the time of the assignment, excluding the increase
in value by reason of improvements made on the premises by the
alienees, and giving the dowress the benefit of any increase from
other circumstances ; or, as expressed by this court, by SH.EPLEY,
J., in Carter v. Parker, 28 Me. 509, "The widow is entitled to
have such part 'of the land set out to her as dower as will produce
an income equal to one-third part of the income which the whole
estate would now produce if no improvements had been made upon
it since it was conveyed by tht husband."
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"She is not entitled to be endowed of improvements made by
the grantee of the husband, or by the assignee of such grantee.
The widow is to be excluded from the improved value arising from
the labor and money expended upon the land since the alienation,
but not from that which has arisen from other causes :" 2,Iosher v.
.Mosher, 15 Me. 371.
"The plaintiff is entitled to her dower, excluding in the assignment of it any improvements made by the grantee or his assignee
since the alienation :" Harvey v. ffobbs, 16 Me. 80.
The contention that arises between the parties is whether expressions like those above quoted from our own decisions apply only to
the lot in which dower is demanded in the suit, and is to be set
out; or whether, where, as here, the lot is part of a larger parcel
aliened by the husband by one conveyance, they exclude all
increased value by reason of improvements by other grantees of
the alienee on other parts of the parcel.
Such a contention could not arise under the English rule, as laid
down by Lord DENMAN in -Riddellv. Gwinnell, 1 Adol. & El. 682,
(41 E. C. L. R. 728), where he discusses at large the ancient
authorities, Fitzherbert, and Plowden, and Coke, and concludes
that, considering the nature of dower and the remedy provided for
it by the law of England, the right unquestionably attaches on all
of the lands of which the husband was seised during the coverture,
"at the period of his death according to its then actual value without regard to the hands which brought it into the condition in
which it is found; the law apparently presuming that it will continue substantially the same up to the assignment." He adds,
"Mr. Park (on Dower 257) informs us that 'the understanding
of the profession is that the wife shall be endowed of the land as
she finds it at the time of her title to dower consummated.' We
have permission from Sir EDWARD SUGDEN, to state that he always
considered the rule to be that the widow was entitled to have
assigned to her as her dower, so much in value as is equal to a
third in value according to the condition of the estate at the time
of her husband's death." In fine, under Lord DENMAN's rule, he
who builds on land in which there is an outstanding inchoate right
of dower finds himself, after the death of the husband, when the
dowress comes, in the position of any other man who builds on land
to which another has a paramount title.
But in this country, where land is more widely distributed in
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smail parcels, and changes owners more frequently, the possession
of it being less valued and the title less scrutinized than in
England, it was long ago felt that such a rule would often produce
inequitable and, in some cases, disastrous results; and the common law as held by the courts changed to accommodate itself to the
new circumstances. The modification seems to have been adopted
for the reasons referred to by PARSONS, C. J., in Gore v. Brazier,
8 Mass. 544, prominent among which is the idea that public policy
requires it, so that purchasers may not be discouraged from improving their lands.
Widows, whose husbands had aliened with warranty during the
coverture, and whose interest in the personalty that might be
required to respond for a breach of the warranty was large, would
be likely also to adjust their claims, if they made any, upon easy
terms, so that neither their children's nor* their own share of the
personalty would be burdened thereby.
However it has come about, the difference between the American rule and that of Lord DENMAiT is well established. The
husband, while he has theoretically no control over his wife's right
to dower, has it in his power to affect its value by his conveyances; i. e., he may compel her to claim and receive it in many
small parcels, the owner of each of which may set out her dower
therein, excluding the value of all improvements made thereon by
himself or his grantors since the alienation by the husband.
The natural tendency of such alienation under the American
rule is to diminish the value of the dower, because there is less
probability that the dowress will be able to put many small parcels
to the profitable use which she might make of one large one. The
question presented in this case, then, is one which is almost sure
to arise whenever the husband has aliened without warranty a considerable tract that has been subsequently divided and improved,
and it needs careful consideration.
The counsel for the defendant ingeniously argues that the subdivision since the alienation should not affect the general principle,
because the dowress will in that way in her various suits indirectly
get the benefit of all the improvements made on the for acres,
which clearly she could not do if it had remained the property of
the original purchaser, and had been improved by him, or by many
purchasers as tenants in common; and he claims that, while the
subdivision affects the mode of proceeding to obtain the dower and
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of setting it out, these are only matters of form, not of substance,
and the dowress should be excluded from the benefit of all improvements made on the premises aliened by the husband, as well as
those made by the defendant or his grantors, on the premises in
which dower is demanded in this writ.
If we were satisfied that the subdivision affected the setting out
of the dower in the form only and not in substance, it would go
far to show that the governing principle ought not to be changed
because of the subdivision after the alienation. But we think this
proposition of the defendant cannot be maintained.
As before suggested, dower in a single parcel of four acres, set
out, as it ought to be, in one piece, is obviously capable of being
used in various ways more profitably than detached pieces of insignificant dimensions, such as the dowress might be obliged to accept
when the subdivision has taken place. These last might depend
for their value mainly upon the inconvenience to which the
occupant of the small lot is subjected by the possession of the
dowress, and his ability and willingness to free himself from that
inconvenience by payment of a reasonable sum to procure the
extinguishment or release of her right. We think there is a substantial difference between the dower in a single four-acre piece
and dower in the same when it has been divided into a score of
small lots. Moreover, the case finds that, after the parcel went
into the hands of the husband's alienee, a street was opened
through the tract, preparatory to the subdivision of the remainder.
Whether this was by dedication and acceptance does not appear;
nor is it material, for, however it was brought about, the effect was
to defeat the claim for dower in so much of the four acres as was
thus appropriated. 1 Washburn on Real Property (1 ed.), Book
1, c. 7, § 37, p. 220, and cases there cited.
Now, if the husband had aliened in small lots, as the tract is
now divided to the several owners, of whom the defendant is one,
it would not be contended that the owner of either lot could claim
that any improvements, except those made by himself upon his
own lot should be excluded from the estimate. We think, for the
reasons assigned at large in Fosdick v. Cooding, 1 Maine 30,
that, since the consequences to the widow in respect of dower must
be the same where he aliens to one and the grantee afterwards
conveys in several parcels to several, the rule for the assignment
should be the same in such case as it would be if the husband had
made the division directly.

